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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper establishes new existence and welfare results for the Kiyotaki-Wright model
[1989] considering mixed strategies that do not restrict agents to play a unique strategy for each
opportunity set. For a general version of the model, I construct many equilibria in which goods
with poor  storage properties are widely accepted while better goods are less accepted.
Furthermore, I show that these equilibria may be socially desirable because more trade occurs
that in the alternative equilibria in which better goods are those which are widely accepted. The
nontechnical intuition is that if intrinsically attractive objects have great acceptance, people
would be very reluctant to trade them away. In contrast, if intrinsically unattractive objects are
the objects that are widely accepted, people would be less reluctant to trade them away and,
consequently, more trade may occur.
By analogy, those results may be helpful in analyzing historical episodes in which a
society faced the choice of a commodity standard; say, the election between a gold standard and
a silver standard. For instance, my welfare results may help us to evaluate the controversial rush
after 1867 to adopt the gold standard, the appreciating and possibly the convenient standard,
by the great commercial nations of the time. In fact, we may have a reconstruction in a general
equilibrium model of the so-called crimes of 1873 in US and France (see Friedman [1990 b] and
Flandreau [1996]). That is, my results may suggest that keeping (as in China, India, Mexico, etc.)
the silver standard, the depreciating and possibly the inconvenient standard,  was a sound
economic policy decision as discussed for some protagonists. Therefore, we may have some
support to the alleged claim of some silver advocates that the “worst standard was the best”
(Conant et al. [1903, p. 501]); that is, perhaps with more precision, that the intrinsically worst
commodity standard may be the socially best one.
General description of the model
The Kiyotaki-Wright model is a discrete time model in which infinitely-lived agents are
randomly matched pairwise in each period. The agents maximize expected discounted utility by
choosing trading strategies for indivisible objects that are perfectly durable but costly to store.
When there are more than two goods, there must be other than double coincidence trade because
of the assumed pattern of specialization in production and consumption. According to Aiyagari-
Wallace [1997], the Kiyotaki-Wright model “is the only attractive model with an endogenous
transaction pattern” (p. 2-3; see also Wallace [1996, p. 251]). In turn, Wallace [1997] indicate
that this model is the first one “in which several objects are potential media of exchange and in
which the relationship between the physical properties of those objects and their role as media of
exchange can be studied” (p. 3).
General description of the results
I describe next the results exhibited in this paper which are for storage costs of goods
nearly equal. For any number of goods larger than two and an open set of parameters and initial
conditions, I prove the existence of multiple mixed-strategy equilibria in which the most costly
to-sore good is universally accepted in trade. In this equilibria, agents play trading strategies nearPage 2
to always trade. I also prove that there exists a continuum of stable steady states of this kind.
Notice that these results are for a general version of the model. Moreover, assuming three goods,
I show that these equilibria Pareto dominate to alternative equilibria in which less costly to-store
goods are universally accepted. Furthermore, they also Pareto dominate the alternative mixed
strategy equilibrium displayed in Renero [1999] and in which the most costly to-store good has
the highest acceptance rate and agents are restricted to play a unique strategy for each
opportunity set. Notice that these results are for equilibria, not steady states.
The mixed-strategy  equilibria are interesting because agents have to be indifferent in
trade among goods which are not their consumption good. Hence, acceptability, saleability, or
“liquidity” has to compensate for poor storage properties. That is, the acceptance of a good,
which is endogenous in the model, varies directly with its storage cost, which is exogenous in the
model.
Technical intuition for the results
The technical intuition of these results are closely related to the properties of paths with
always-trade strategies. First of all, always-trade strategies maximize the fraction of agents who
consume. Hence, always-trade strategies may be socially desirable. However, they are
equilibrium strategies if and only if goods are equally costly to store.
If goods are equally costly to store and always-trade strategies are played, then agents are
indifferent among holding goods other that their consumption good. Consequently, always-trade
strategies are individually optimal. This situation is very suggestive. If objects are not equally
costly to store but not too different, then one may suspect the existence of individually optimal
mixed strategies where the acceptance of an object varies directly with its storage cost and agents
are indifferent among goods. In fact, for small enough differences in storage costs, I show that
for any number of goods larger than two, many equilibria which such strategies exist. Moreover,
those trading strategies are near to always trade. Therefore, one may conjecture that this type of
equilibria may have good welfare properties relative to equilibria in which less costly to-store
goods have the highest acceptance. For the case of three goods, I verify this conjecture.
However, the mixed-strategy equilibrium exhibited in Renero [1999], which is for the
case of three goods, cannot come very close to always trade because it satisfies the restriction
that agents play a unique strategy for each opportunity set –a restriction which, as shown by
Kehoe-Kiyotaki-Wright [1993], implies that the number of steady states is generically finite.
Even though, this restricted mixed-strategy equilibrium  Pareto dominates to the alternative
equilibria in which less costly to-store goods are universally accepted. The technical intuition for
this welfare result is that mixed strategies are still closer to always trade. Moreover, the implied
distribution of goods is more symmetric relative to those alternative equilibria.
Since the distribution of goods of the unrestricted mixed-strategy equilibria exhibited in
this paper are practically as symmetric as that of the restricted mixed-strategy equilibrium, the
Pareto ranking among these equilibria has to be explained for the closeness of the strategies to
always trade.Page 3
Early work on the model
Early work on the  Kiyotaki-Wright model [1989] seemed to be consistent with the
intuitive idea that good intrinsic properties (say, storability, the depreciation rate, or the rate of
return
1) were necessary or desirable for objects to be universally accepted in equilibrium. For
instance, for any number of goods and one fiat object,  Aiyagari-Wallace [1991] prove the
existence of a steady state in which the least costly to-store object is universally accepted in
trade. In fact, this result seems to be the conspicuous part of the first analysis of a general version
of the model.
2 Also, assuming two goods and an one fiat object, Aiyagary-Wallace [1992] show
that the fiat object is accepted in equilibrium only if it is the least costly to-store object.
Moreover, they exhibit three multiple  equilibria which are  Pareto ranked according to the
acceptability of the fiat object: the greater the acceptability of the fiat object the better. (Other
work apparently with the same spirit on modified versions of the model is Marimon-McGrattan-
Sargent [1990] and Williamson-Wright [1994].)
However, two early results for the Kiyotaki-Wright model [1989] are inconsistent with
the extreme idea that only objects with the best intrinsic property could be universally accepted
in equilibrium. For the case of three goods and no fiat objects, Kiyotaki-Wright [1989] show the
existence of a steady state in which the universally accepted good is the second least costly to-
store. For the case of three goods and one fiat object, Aiyagari-Wallace [1992] claim a numerical
example of a steady state in which the fiat object being the second least costly to-store is
universally accepted. However, it is not known if these kinds of steady states generalize to more
than three goods.
Finally, there is one early  result which may contradict the idea that good intrinsic
properties are necessary for an object to be universally accepted in equilibrium. Although they
did not call attention to it, Kehoe-Kiyotaki-Wright [1993] display for three goods and no fiat
objects a steady state in which the worst object is universally accepted. However, their steady
state is different from those I show exist and it is not known also whether their kind of steady
state generalizes to more than three goods. Moreover, for the strategy spaces that  Kehoe-
Kiyotaki-Wright [1993] assume, it is shown in Renero [1998] that for almost any initial
condition (or given any initial condition and for almost any parameters), there does not exist an
equilibrium approaching to that steady state.
Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I give the description of the
environment, the notation, and the equilibrium definition. In Section 3, I establish properties of
paths with always-trade strategies which are used in many of the proofs. In Section 5, I deal with
the case of three goods and no fiat objects. In Section 6, I make some concluding remarks.
Technical proofs and a graph mentioned in Section 6 are in the Appendix.
                                                                
1 The rate of return is considered explicitly as an intrinsic property in Aiyagari-Wallace-Wright [1996, p. 398] and in
Wallace [1997, p. 11].
2 As far as I know, my general results constitute the other analysis so far of the same version of the model and for
that matter of any general version of the model.Page 4
2. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND EQUILIBRIUM DEFINITION
I will use the physical environment, notation, and essentially the equilibrium concept of
the Aiyagari-Wallace [1992] exposition of the Kiyotaki-Wright model [1989]. I give next a brief
description of these items. For reader’s convenience, I abstract of fiat objects.
3
2.1 The Physical Environment
Time is discrete and represented by the positive integers. There exist N ‡ 3 goods which
are assumed to be perfectly-durable and indivisible goods. The goods are indexed by the set {1,
..., N}. There are N types of infinitely-lived agents indexed also by the set {1, ..., N}. Type i
consumes good and produces good i+1. There is a [0,1/N] continuum of agents for each type.
Agents maximize expected discounted utility with discount factor of  r  e (0,1).  In any
period, a type-i agent’s utility of neither consuming nor storing anything is zero, the utility of
consuming one unit of good i without storing anything is ui > 0, and the utility of not consuming
and storing one unit of object j from the given period until the next period is -cij £ 0. After
consuming one unit of good i, agent of type i produces one unit of good i+1 which appears at the
beginning of next period. At the beginning of the initial period t = 1, each agent is endowed with
one unit a good. Finally, each period each agent is paired randomly with one other agent. It is
assumed that paired agents know each other’s type and current inventory but not trading
histories.
2.2 Definition of Equilibrium
Next, I define a class of Nash equilibria with rational expectations. In particular, I assume
that the strategies are symmetric, i.e., all agents of the same type in the same situation use the
same strategy, and that trading strategies are nondiscriminatory, i.e., willingness to trade does
not depend on the type of agents one meets. Moreover, we assume that agents do not dispose of
objects and do not postpone consumption. We require that in equilibrium the actions of each
agent are individually optimizing given the actions of the other agents and the path of inventory
distribution of stocks. The notation presumes that each agent start each period with one unit of a
good. That is, we assume additionally that agents never give a good away to another agent for
nothing.
4
Therefore, the timing of an agent’s activities in period t is that he or she starts with one
good, meets another agent, ends up with some good after meeting, and then stores or consumes
and produces to start at period t+1 with some good.
                                                                
3 For a treatment which include fiat objects see Renero [1994].
4 In fact, we can ignore gift giving because, as noticed by Aiyagari-Wallace [1991], it is never an equilibrium
strategy given the following small and otherwise innocuos change to the model: let agents derive some small enough
utility from consuming any good.Page 5
I give next notation for the trading strategies of the agents and other items. The
probability of choosing to trade good j for good k by those who are type i, hold good j, and meet
another agent with good k at period t, is denoted by  ) (t s
k
ij . The vector of these over (j,k) is
denoted by  ) (t si  and the vector of these over (i,j,k) is denoted by  ) (t s .
The symbol  ) (t pij  denotes the proportion of agents who are type i and hold good j at the
start of period t. The symbol  ) (t p  denotes the vector of these elements or the distribution of
inventories; that is,  ) (t p  is the state of system. The law of motion of the sequence  { } ) (t p  is
denoted by
[ ] ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( t s t p h t p = + ,
where h is defined by the following two equations














ij ij ij t s t s t p t p t s t s t p t p t p t a ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
(1.2)  ( ) ) ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( , 1 t a t a t p ii j i ij ij ij + + - = + d d
where dkn = 1 and 0 otherwise.
In (1.1), the symbol aij(t) represents the proportion of agents who are type i and end up
with object j after the random meetings at period t. On the RHS of (1.1), the first term is the
proportion of agents who are type i and hold object j at the start of period t and, consequently,
before the random meetings at period t; the second term is the proportion of agents who are type
i and held object j before the random meetings and traded for a different object; and the third
term is the proportion of agents who are type i and who did not hold object j before the random
meetings and who traded for object j at period t. In (1.2), if j = i, then  0 ) 1 ( = + t pij  because
agents do not postpone consumption; if j = i+1, then  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( t a t a t p ii ij ij + = +  because aii(t) is the
fraction of agents who produce good i+1; lastly, if j „  i and j „ i+1, then  ) ( ) 1 ( t a t p ij ij = + .
Let  ) (t vij  denote the expected discounted utility of agent of type i ending with object j
after trade at period t, but before consuming, storing, or disposing, and let 
) ( ) (
N N t v ￿ ˛  denote
the vector of expected utilities. Given the sequence  { } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t s t p , there exists a unique
bounded sequence of vectors { } ) (t v  which satisfy the dynamic-programming equations
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(2.2) 



























The existence and uniqueness of the bounded sequence  { } ) (t v  follow from the fact that the RHS
of equations (2.1) and (2.2) are contractions as functions of the components of the vector v(t).
The individual optimizing conditions for trading strategies are
(3.1)  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = ‡ t s if t v t v
k
ij ik ij
(3.2)  1 ) ( ) ( ) ( = £ t s if t v t v
k
ij ik ij
(3.3)  1 ) ( 0 ) ( ) ( < < = t s if t v t v
k
ij ik ij .
The condition about optimality of consumption after acquiring the consumption good is
(3.4)  [ ] ) ( ) ( 1 , 1 , t v c u c t v c u i i ij i ii i i ij i + + + + + - ‡ + + r
The condition about otimality of nondisposal is
(3.5)  0 ) ( ‡ t vij
Therefore, we have the next definitions.
DEFINITION 1.  A symmetric equilibrium  from p(1), in which agents ( i) do not play
discriminatory strategies, (ii) do not dispose of objects, and (iii) do not postpone consumption, is
a path  { } ) ( ), 1 ( t s t p +  such that
(1)  [ ] ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( t s t p h t p = + , and
(2)  there exists a bounded sequence  { } ) (t v  such that equations (2.1)-(2.2) and (3.1)-(3.5)
hold.
Notice that the equilibrium condition (2) requires that the sequence  { } ) (t si  be the best
response of any agent of type i taken as given the path  { } ) ( ), 1 ( t s t p + .
DEFINITION 2.  A symmetric steady state, in which agents (i) do not play discriminatory
startegies, (ii) do not dispose of objects, and (iii) do not postpone consumption, is a constant (p,s)
such that [ ] ) , ( ) ( ), 1 ( s p t s t p = +  for all t ‡ 1 satisfies Definition 1 when p(1) = p.Page 7
3. ALWAYS TRADE
I will prove next some properties of paths with always-trade strategies. All these facts are
crucial to prove claims of section 4. Kiyotaki-Wright [1989], considering stationary paths for the
case of three goods and no fiat objects, notice that always-trade strategies, though possibly not
individual optimal, could give the agents higher consumption rates than a particular steady state.
In Lemma 3.1, which is proved in the Appendix, I establish that always-trade strategies played
by good holders maximize the fraction of people who get their consumption good,  ￿i ii t a ) ( , if
no agents holds his or her consumption good at the start of any period; that is, if agents do not
postpone consumption.
LEMMA 3.1. Let  [ ] ) ( ), ( t s t p  be a pair of vectors of distribution of inventories and of trading










ii t s t s t p t p t a ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( .
Then,  N t a
i ii 1 ) ( £ ￿  and with equality if all  1 ) ( = t s
k
ij  and  0 ) ( = t pii .
Thus, always-trade strategies of good holders maximize the fraction of agents who
consume if agents do not postpone consumption and, consequently, they may be socially
desirable. Moreover, since the fraction of agents who consume are equal across types if the
inventory distribution is constant (Aiyagari-Wallace [19991]), always-trade strategies maximize
the fraction of agents who consume by type in constant paths. In the next section, I will show
that there exist parameters for which the fraction of agents who consume is close to  N
1 , the
upper bound for aggregate consumption.
I establish in Lemma 3.2, which is proved in the Appendix, that the law of motion h of
paths with always-trade strategies, s
AT, nondisposal, and nonpostponement of consumption, is a
z-stage contraction for some positive integer z. It follows that this kind of path converges to p
AT ,
where 
2 - = N p
AT




+ = N p
AT
i i .
LEMMA 3.2. There exists z ￿ ˛  such that  [ ]
AT s h , ￿  is a z-stage contraction on the space A =
{ } ￿ = = ￿ ˛ + k ii ik
N N p and N p p 0 1 :
) (  and with the sup  metric defined by
( ) { } ij ij
j i
p p p p d ¢ - = ¢
) , (
max , .Page 8
4. MANY EQUILIBIA AND MANY STEADY STATES
I will use continuity arguments to prove that for an open set of parameters (which include
equal storage costs) and initial conditions, there exist many multiple equilibria (i.e., equilibria
from the same initial condition) and even a continuum of steady states with mixed trading
strategies. Moreover, for each steady state of this continuum there exists a neighborhood of the
steady state such that for any initial condition in that neighborhood there exists an equilibrium
converging to the steady state.
The proofs of these claims are long and technical. Therefore, I exhibit next the key and
possibly instructive steps as lemmas leaving the proofs to the Appendix.
The next lemma assumes implicitly that agents do not give gifts, do not dispose of
objects, and do not postpone consumption, and it gives necessary and sufficient conditions for
agents to be indifferent in trade for all goods but their respective consumption.
LEMMA 4.1:  Given  { } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t s t p , let  { } ) (t v  satisfy equations (2.1)-(2.2). Then,
) ( ) ( t v t v in ij = , j „ i, n „ i, for all t, if and only if












ki ki i i i ij in t s t p t s t p c u c c ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 , r
for all t.
The last lemma says that agents are indifferent all along the path in holding different goods but
their respective consumption goods if and only if the difference of storage costs across goods is
compensated by the difference in expected discounted utility from consumption next period all
along the path. Notice that Lemma 4.1 implies that always-trade strategies are equilibrium
strategies if and only if goods are equally costly to store
5.
Part of the next work is proving that the condition of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied. For
convenience, I use the next notation:  { } i j c argmax ij „ ˛ : e[i] ; that is e[i] is one of the most
costly to-store goods, with exception of the respective consumption good, for agents of type i.
The next lemma establishes that for sequences of inventory distributions and parameters
( ) ij i c u , , r  in an open set, there exist individually-optimal actions for all type of agents: trading
strategies, not postponement of consumption, and not freely disposing. Further, the trading
strategies can be arbitrarily close to always-trade strategies, 
AT s , and some strategies can be
fixed at values out of a continuum.
LEMMA 4.2: Assume  [ ]( ) N c u c i i i ij / 1 1 , + + <r . For every neighborhood D of 
AT s , there exist a
neighborhood M of 
AT p , an open set W of parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r  (a set that includes equal
                                                                
5 Aiyagari-Wallace[1991] give a proof for steady states.Page 9
storage costs), and a positive number  1 < w , such that for any sequence  { } ) 1 ( + t p  of M, any
parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r  in W, and any w in  ) 1 , (w ,
(1)  there exists a sequence  { } ) (t s  and a bounded sequence  { } ) (t v  such that equations
(2.1)-(2.2) and (3.1)-(3.5) hold,
(2)  D ˛ ) (t s ,
(3)  w t s
i e
ki = ) (
] [ , k „ e[i].
Notice that w in (3) of Lemma 4.2 may be indexed by k and i (see Renero [1994]). That
is, the continuum at which some strategies can be fixed may be multidimensional but for
simplicity a unidimensional continuum is used.
Notice also that Lemma 4.2 does not provide equilibria because nothing is said about the
initial condition p(1) and the law of motion  [ ] ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( t s t p h t p = + . Here the difficulty is that the
path  { } ) ( ), 1 ( t s t p +  satisfy this law of motion and  { } ) 1 ( + t p  be in the neighborhood M of Lemma
4.2. The next lemma deals with this problem for initial conditions p(1) in an open set.
LEMMA 4.3:  For every neighborhood M of p
AT, there exist a neighborhood C of p
AT and a
neighborhood D of 
AT s , such that for any p(1) in C and any sequence  { } ) (t s  in  D, the path
{ } ) 1 ( + t p  given by  [ ] ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( t s t p h t p = +  is in M.
Therefore, for parameters and initial conditions in an open sets, Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3
imply the existence of multiple equilibria from p(1) in which some strategies are fixed, all along
the path, at values out of a continuum.
Proposition 4.4, whose proof  is left to the Appendix, establishes the existence of a
continuum of steady states which are approachable from nearby initial conditions. I take
advantage that the notation is simpler for steady states to present and explain important
characteristics of steady states, and equilibria, with mixed trading strategies.
PROPOSITION 4.4:  Assume  [ ]( ) N c u c i i i ij / 1 1 , + + <r . For every neighborhood  D of 
AT s ,
there exist an open set W of parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r  (a set that includes equal storage costs) and a
positive number  1 < w , such that for  any parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r  in W and any w in  ) 1 , (w , there
exists a steady state (p,s) in which
1)  D ˛ s ,
2)  w s
i e
ki =
] [ , k „ e[i],Page 10
3)  [ ] 1 ,
] [ ,
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ki s s = , j  „ k, j  „ l, there exist a
neighborhood O  of the steady-state p such that for any p(1) ˛ O, there exist equilibria from p(1)
converging to the steady state (p,s).
Notice that for simplicity w in 2) of Prop. 4.4 is not indexed by k and  i (see Renero
[1994]).
Notice also that according with 3) of Proposition 4.4, holding object e[i] gives the highest
probability to agents of type i of trading for their consumption good. Such probability is given by
i i e i e k ki p w p ], [ ] [ + ￿ „  while the probability of trading for their consumption good when holding
object j is given by  [ ] 1 ,
] [ ,






ij i e i






Part 4) of Proposition 4.4 gives the fraction of agents who consume N aii.  If  1 = w  and
0 ] [ , = - ij i e i c c , agents always trade and  ( ) N a N ii / 1 = , i.e., the fraction of agents who consume is
the biggest possible according to Lemma 3.1.
Notice also that assuming e[i] = e, i „ e (i.e., the good e is the most costly to-store good
for everybody except possibly for agents of type e), Proposition 4.4 says that there exist steady
states in which the most costly to-store good for everybody is accepted with probability near to
one (or probability one if  1 = w ) for parameters in an open set. In fact, there exists a continuum
of steady states, labeled by w with this feature.
Moreover, the last part of Proposition 4.4 establishes that at least for each steady state of




ki s s = , j „ k, j „ l, there exists a neighborhood of the
steady state such that for any initial condition in that neighborhood there exists an equilibrium
converging to the steady state.
Proposition 4.4 may seem to contradict a proposition provided by Kehoe et al. [1993] for
the case of three goods and no fiat objects. This proposition establishes a finite number of
symmetric steady states for almost any parameters; i.e., with  exeption possibly of a set of
parameters of  Lebesque measure zero. Actually, there is no contradiction because they are
dealing with a somehow modified version of the model or equilibrium definition. The




ij s s . That is, if the probability of choosing to trade good j
for good k by those who are of type i, hold good j, and meet another agent with good k, is 
k
ij s ,Page 11
then the probability of choosing to trade good k for good j by those who are of type i, hold good
k, and meet another agent with good j, is trade good j for good k by those who are of type i, hold
good j, and meet another agent with good j, is 
k
ij s - 1 .
5. WELFARE IN THE MODEL WITH THREE GOODS
I deal in this section with the original model specification of three goods and no fiat
objects. However, I do not restrict the analysis either to steady states or to pure strategies. I will
show that there exist two-period convergent equilibria in which the most costly to-store good is
universally accepted and in which all agents play mixed trading strategies. Moreover, I will show
that these equilibria Pareto superior to other equilibria with a different transaction pattern; in
particular, equilibria with universal acceptance of less costly to-store goods or with highest
acceptance rate but not with universal acceptance of the most costly to-store good.
There are more than one way to prove this claim. The one that we will follow here, which
seems to be the easiest one, is to make use of the results in Renero [1999, Prop. 3.4]. There,
allowing only mixed strategies that restrict agents to play a unique strategy for each opportunity
set, I prove that there exists a two-period convergent equilibrium in which agents play mixed
strategies and which is Pareto superior to the other equilibria in which less costly to-store goods
are universally accepted. Consequently, we need just to show here that (1) there exist two-period
convergent equilibria in which all agents play mixed strategies and in which the most costly to-
store good is universally accepted, and that, by transitivity, (2) these equilibria Pareto superior
that equilibria with mixed strategies which restrict agents to play a unique strategy for each
opportunity set. The proof of the welfare ranking relies on the fact that all multiple equilibria
converge and consequently the welfare ranking is determined by the ranking of the steady-state
expected utilities for a discount factor r close enough to 1. For reader’s convenience and to
establish some notation, I will review next the associated steady states.
For an open set of parameters, Kiyotaki-Wright [1989] exhibit a pure-strategy steady
state  ( )
f f s p ,  in which the least costly to-store good has universal acceptance if the storage costs
of goods,  ij c , satisfy either the inequalities  3 2 1 i i i c c c < <  or the inequalities  2 3 1 i i i c c c < < . The
vector s
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The trading startegies of agents of type 1 are optimal if  [ ]
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Actually, the pair  ( )
f f s p ,  is the only steady state with universal acceptance of the east costly to-
store good if the inequality above holds.Page 12
For an open set of parameters, Kiyotaki-Wright [1989] also exhibit a pure-strategy steady
state  ( )
s s s p ,  in which the second least costly to-store good has universal acceptance if the
storage costs of goods,  ij c , satisfy either the inequalities  2 3 1 i i i c c c < < . (Remember that type-i
agents produce good i+1 with modulus 3.) The vector of trading strategies  s
s   is given by
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I prove in Renero [1999] that there exists a steady state  ( )
c c s p ,  with mixed strategies
which restrict agents to play a unique strategy for each opportunity set if all goods are equally to-
store. The vector s
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c AT p p = . I also prove in Renero [1999] that for an open set of parameters and initial
conditions there exists a two-period converging equilibrium close to ( )
c c s p , .
The next proposition establishes that for an open set of parameters and initial conditions,
there exist multiple equilibria which are Pareto ranked. In particular, that there exist many, many
two-period convergent equilibria in which agents play mixed trading strategies and in which the
most costly to-store good has universal acceptance. Moreover, these equilibria Pareto superior to
other equilibria with universal acceptance of less costly to-store goods or with mixed startegies
that restrict agents to play a unique strategy for each opportunity set.
PROPOSITION 5: Assume N = 3 and either  3 2 1 i i i c c c < <  or  2 3 1 i i i c c c < < . There exists a
neighborhood P of 
c AT p p =  and an open set Y  of parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r  (a set that includes
equal storage costs), such that for any p(1) ˛ P and any parameters in Y,
(i)  the path  { }
f s t p ), 1 ( +  from p(1) converges and it is an equilibrium and the only
equilibrium in which  1 ) (
1 = t sij , j „ i;Page 13
(ii)  for  2 3 1 i i i c c c < < , the path  { }
f s t p ), 1 ( +  from p(1) converges and it is an equilibrium and
the only equilibrium in which  1 ) (





(iii)  there exists a two-period convergent equilibrium from p(1) in which agents play mixed




ij  and which Pareto superior to the equilibria
in (i) and (ii);
(iv)  there exists a continuum of equilibria from p(1) converging in two periods to the same
steady state (out of a continuum) and in which agents play mixed trading strategies and in
which the most costly to-store good is universally accepted; moreover, these equilibria
Pareto superior to the equilibria in (i), (ii), and (iii).
Proof: Claims (i)-(iii) are Prop. 3.4 in Renero [1999]. The existence claim of (iv) follows
by establishing first steady states  ( )
w w s p ,  using a more general version of Prop. 4.4 (which
indexes w of 2) by k and i) either for  1
3 , =
w
ij s  and  13
2 ,
13 w s
w =  if  3 2 1 i i i c c c < < , or for  1 ) (




w =  if  2 3 1 i i i c c c < < . Secondly, the two-period convergence follows by using any strategies
s(1) which satisfy the equalities
[ ]
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 , 1 1 ,
2
, 1 , 1
1






+ + + + + + +
+
- - - -
=
i i i i
i
i i i i
i
i i i i i i i i
w
i i i
i i p p
s p s p p p p
s
for any p(1) close enough to p
AT  to have p
w = h[p(1),s(1)].
The claim of the Pareto ranking follows by transitivity, continuity, and for the discount
factor r close enough to 1 since (1) all  equilibria converge for p(1) in a neighborhood of
c AT p p =  and (2) the components of the expected-utility vectors v
c associated to the steady state
( )
c c s p ,  are smaller than those of the expected-utility vector v
AT associated to  ( )
AT AT s p ,  if for
every type of agents all goods are equally costly to store. z
Notice that because the strategies s(1) are undetermined if agents play mixed strategies
all along the path, we choose strategies s(1) such that the paths with mixed strategies converge in
two periods; that is, such that [ ] ( ) s p t s t p , ) 1 ( ), 1 ( = + +  for t ‡ 1. In fact, there exists a continuum
of such strategies (as the equality given in the proof above shows) for unrestricted mixed
strategies that make the equilibrium paths to converge to the same steady state. Notice also that
there exists a continuum of steady states (indexed by 
2 ,
13
w s  if  3 2 1 i i i c c c < <  or 
3 ,
12
w s  if
2 3 1 i i i c c c < < ) with this feature.Page 14
6. SOME CONCLUDING REMAKS
In order to make an interpretation of my analytical results, I recall next briefly some
historical facts. Around the last quarter of the XIX century, gold was the appreciating standard
and the silver the depreciating standard; say, gold was the best standard and silver was the worst
standard. In fact, the gold-silver price ratio “skyrocketed”. According to Friedman [1990 b, p.
1169], from “15.4 in 1870, it jumped to 16.4 by 1873, 18.4 by 1879, and 30 by 1896”. A stylized
explanation may be that many important countries, specially European countries and US, quit
successively in and after 1873 the free coinage of silver and embrace sooner than later a gold
standard. Consequently, as it was expected, the demand for monetary purposes increased for gold
and decreased for silver.
It seems that after The International Monetary Conference held in Paris in 1867 the
posture of “gold standard for all civilized nations” had an increasing acceptation around the
world (see Casasús [1893, p. 83] and Russell [1898, p. 84]). However, the adoption of the gold
standard has been at least controversial in US and, perhaps, in other countries as well. In fact,
some countries kept in practice a silver standard for a while –Mexico, for instance, until 1905.
Taking into account the possible changes in the demand of silver and gold, for countries like US
and Mexico the options were apparently to have (1) a higher growth of the price level, even
inflation, with a silver standard; or (2) a lower growth in the price level, even deflation, with a
gold standard.
United Kingdom adopted a gold standard in 1819. US quit the free coinage of silver in
1873 and it resumed a specie standard on the basis of gold in 1879. According to Friedman [1990
b, p. 1170] the deflation from 1875 to 1896 for US was about 1.7 percent per year and for the
United Kingdom 0.8 percent per year. To compare with the data available for Mexico, we can
use the data provided by Friedman [1990 b, Table A1] to obtain the average annual rate of
change in the price level for the periods 1877-1886 and 1886-1904. In this way we obtain -1.65%
and 0.4%, respectively, for the US; and –1.22% and 0.32%, respectively, for the United
Kingdom.
For Mexico, the only price index available for the years of 1877 and 1886 gives an
annual average rate of 1.77.
6 The inflation might have been no bigger in average than 3.1% per
year for the period 1886-1904.
7 Furthermore, Mexican protagonists seemed to have observed
price stability, specially in consumption goods, at least for the 1890’s (see Romero 1898, p.600
including fn. 1) which seems to be consistent with modern computations of price indexes.
8
                                                                
6 See El Colegio de México, p. 172. ( These data are reproduced by INEGI as Cuadro 19.2.)
7 See Zabludowsky [1992, p.299] who, as far as I know, gives figures with the biggest credible increase of prices for
the period by considering apparently prices of Mexican exports. The biggest annual inflation was 13% where
periods of inflation alternate with years of deflation of up 11% per year. Taking the geometric average for five years,
the change of the price level would be between –1% and 6% for the period 1886-1904.  Solís [1975, 1991] gives
index figures for the period 1887-1904 with an average growth of prices of 6.50 and 6.02% respectively. However,
Solís have been criticized by Zabludowsky [1992, p. 292, fn. 6] for not giving his methodology and his figures have
been qualified as doubtful.
8 See, for instance, El Colegio de México, p. 156-7 (reproduced as Cuadro 19.3 in INEGI), p. 172 (reproduced as
Cuadro 19.2 in INEGI), and Cuadro 19.7 of INEGI)Page 15
Therefore, it seems that these rates of change of the price level were not too different to
zero at least for today’s standards. That is, one may say that the choice was not between
hyperinflation and deflation, much less hyperinflation against  hyperdeflation; say, moderate
inflation against moderate deflation. Even more, one may say that the choice was among near
rates of deflation or among near rates of inflation for some years.
Hence, those close change rates of price levels may give me the excuse to use the welfare
results exhibited in this paper, which are for nearly equal storage costs, to try to evaluate those
policy options. Furthermore, it seems that silver depreciated not only relative to gold as the data
for Mexico may suggest. In fact, silver depreciated also relative to the US an UK index baskets
of goods for long periods of time.
9 That is, at least in average, silver was apparently the
intrinsically worst good in terms of value appreciation. In the same sense, although less sharply,
gold was apparently the intrinsically best good.
Notice that the silver standard implied the devaluation of the national currency relative to
the currencies based on gold. This seems to have caused great concern among Mexicans.
Moreover, silver was possibly less convenient than gold. In fact, according to Friedman [1990 a,
p.97],  Jevons placed “great emphasis on the inconvenience to wealthier countries of silver
money because it weighs so much more than a quantity of gold of the same value.” Perhaps, one
could argue also that silver was possibly riskier or more volatile than gold in terms of value.
10
What was the best choice? As far as I know, the only formal attempt to answer this
question has been Friedman [1990 b] who simulates with an econometric model the
consequences of keeping the free coinage of silver in US; that is, keeping a bimetallic standard.
He finds that the US would have been in practice under a silver, not gold, standard. Moreover, he
estimates that in US the deflation rate would have been half or less of the actual deflation rate
and eventually there would have been a rise in the price level. Friedman concludes that the act of
1873 was “a mistake that had highly adverse consequences” (p. 1177). That is, keeping the free
coinage of silver, US would have avoided political agitation and deflation together with
economic problems: Economic contractions, “widespread bank failures plus a banking panic in
1893, and a run on U.S. gold reserves by foreigners fearful that silver agitation would force the
United States off the gold standard.” (Friedman b, p. 1176)
                                                                
9 Using the data given by Friedman [1990 b, Table A1] and “changing of numeraire,” one can compute the index of
prices in terms of silver for the UK and US. Hence, I have elaborated the graph which appears at the end of the
Appendix taking the geometric average change of the corresponding index for periods of five years. One can
observe there that the change of the UK index of prices in terms of silver was positive up to 10% between 1877 and
1905. Moreover, this change was bigger than the change of the index of prices in terms of gold for the period 1865-
1905. As regards US, the change of index of prices in terms of silver was positive up to 8% between 1980 and 1905.
Definitely, this change was bigger than the change of the index of prices in terms of gold for the period 1880-1905.
Notice that the US index of prices in terms of gold is given directly by the data because US resumed gold
convertibility in 1879.
10 Using the data given by Friedman [1990 b, Table A1], one can compute the standard deviation of the geometric
average of the index change from 1 to five years. In this way, we can observe that for the UK, the standard
deviations was bigger for the prices in terms of silver than for the prices in terms of gold in the period 1866-1905,
and even for the subperiod 1866-1889. For the US, that standard deviations were also bigger for the period 1880-
1905.Page 16
To try to determine the best choice, I make next an interpretation of my results. The
equilibrium in which the most costly to-store good is universally accepted is analog to an
economy with the worst commodity standard; say the silver standard. Similarly, the alternative
equilibrium in which the least costly to-store good is universally accepted may be analog to the
same economy with the best standard; say the gold standard. That is, the alternative equilibria
may be thought as the options for an economy of feasible commodity standards. Therefore, the
Pareto ranking displayed in this paper of those equilibria may suggest that the best choice was
the silver standard; that is, that the US Act of 1873 was a mistake, or a “crime”, as asserted by
Friedman.
Moreover, that Pareto ranking may give some original support to the next statements by
Matías Romero who was alternatively at least three times Mexican Secretary of the Treasury and
Ambassador to US in the last decades of the XIX century:
…“Everybody in Mexico, that is, from the educated to the ignorant, from the rich to
the poor, from the natives to the foreigners, and even the bankers who in other
countries are decidedly favorable to the gold standard, are all in favor of silver. The
Government holds the same opinion. As Mexico is now prosperous a large portion of
the people attribute its prosperity to the silver standard and are therefore decidedly
favorable to the continuance of that standard”. Romero [1898, p. 576-7]
However, the main argument of Romero and other protagonists about such prosperity
was that the depreciation of silver made the Mexican products more competitive relative to
foreign goods. Needless to say that the Kiyotaki-Wright model is a “closed economy.” The other
arguments were that Mexico attracted more foreign investment and that money supply became
higher because the specie, silver, was exported less. In contrast, according to Limantour [1904a,
p. 427], Mexican Secretary of the Treasury in 1892-1911, the occurrence of silver depreciation
and prosperity was mostly a coincidence. (For a detailed survey of the protagonists’ points of
view about keeping in Mexico the free coinage of silver see Hernández-Renero [1998].)
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.1:  If always-trade strategies are played by agents, the proportion of agents of
type i who consume,  ) (t a
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To see that 1/N  is an upper bound for aggregate consumption implied for any set of
trading strategies, notice that
￿ ￿ ￿
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for all pairs [ ] ) ( ), ( t s t p  of vectors of distribution of inventories and of trading strategies. z
Proof of Lemma 3.2:  Notice first that eqs. (1.1) which define  ( )
AT s h , ￿  can be written as
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Consequently, according to eqs. (1.2),
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We deal next with the aggregated proportions of agents who hold a particular good,
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. Given this result, we can prove the lemma.
Let  ( )
AT s h H , ￿ ” ,  H H ”
1  and 
n n H H H o ”
+1 . Take any pair  ( ) p p ¢ ,  of distributions
of inventories and let the pair  ( ) q q ¢ ,  be given by  ￿ ”
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Thus, for t large enough, 
1 ) 1 ( + - N H
t  is a contraction. z
Proof of Lemma 4.1:  If the sequence  { } ) (t v  satisfy eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) and  ) ( ) ( t v t v in ij = , j „ i, n „
i, for all t, then
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(**) ) ( ) ( 1 , 1 , t v c u t v i i i i i ii + + + + =
Subtracting eqs. (*) wich each other we get eqs. (4.1). This proves the necessity.
To prove the sufficiency, let equations (4.1) hold. We find next a sequence  { } ) ( ~ t v  as a
candidate to satisfy eqs. (2.1)-(2.2). By forward substitution in eqs. (*) and using eqs. (**), we
get the numbers  ) (t vij  as infinite sums of expressions involving only parameters and elements of
the sequence  { } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t s t p . So, the sequence of numbers  ) (t vij  given by these infinite sums
is our candidate  { } ) ( ~ t v . Accordingly, we denote those numbers by  ) ( ~ t vij . Using eqs. (4.1), notice
that the numbers  ) ( ~ t vij  satisfy the equalities  ) ( ~ ) ( ~ t v t v in ij = , j „ i, n „ i,  for all t. Hence, the
sequence  { } ) ( ~ t v  satisfy eqs. (2.1)-(2.2). Therefore, the sufficiency follows since there is one and
only one bounded sequence { } ) (t v  which satisfy eqs. (2.1)-(2.2). zPage 20
The following proofs use the following notation:
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Proof of Lemma 4.2:  Notice that the correspondence  G is upper  hemicontinuous since it is
closed and its  counterdomain is compact. Hence, part (2) of the Lemma follows for
( ) l , ); ( ) ( w t p t s G =  since  ( ) 0 , 1 ;
AT AT p s G = . Notice that part (3) follows by construction in the
definition of G. Now, suppose  ( ) ￿ = ˛ + G = +
) )( (
1 ] 1 , 0 ( , ); 1 ( ) 1 (
N N N
k w t p t s l ; that is, strategies s(t+1)
given by  G strictly positive. Let  { } ) (t v  be the sequence that satisfies  eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) given
{ } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t p t s . Hence, by the definition of G and Lemma 4.1,  ) ( ) ( t v t v in ij = , j „ i, n „ i, for all
t. Consequently, eqs. (3.1)-(3.3) hold.
To guarantee that eqs. (3.4)-(3.5) hold, we use the fact that the sequence  { } ) (t v V ”  that
satisfies eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) given  { } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t p t s  is a “continuous” function of  { } ) 1 ( + ” t p P ,
{ } ) 1 ( + ” t s S , and the parameters  ( ) ij i c u C , , r ” . Since this may not be obvious, I give next an
outline of the proof. For our purposes, the claim has to be about the continuity of that function,
say f, relative to the box topology in the domain and counterdomain. Since the RHS of  eqs.
(2.1)-(2.2) are continuous functions of p(t+1), s(t+1), v(t+1), and the parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r , it
follows that the graph of  f,  { } ) , , ( : ) , , , ( C S P V C S P V f ˛  is closed relative to the  metrizable
product topology: the limit of a sequence on the graph of f is in the graph of f. Hence, f isPage 21
continuous relative to the product topology in the domain and counterdomain because its image
is contained in a compact set in the product topology. Then, considering this topology, for any
open set U there exists an open set W such that v(1) is in U if  { } ( ) [ ] ij i c u t p t s , , , ) 1 ( ), 1 ( r + +  is in
W. Hence, v(t) is also in U if  { } ( ) [ ] ij i c u t p t s , , , ) ( ), ( r t t + +  is in W and the claim of box-
topology continuity follows.
We are now in conditions of finishing the proof of Lemma 4.2. Let  { }
AT v  be the sequence
which satisfies  eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) given the constant sequence  { } ( ) { } 0 , 1 ; , ,
AT AT AT AT p p s p G = .
Notice that the sequence  { }
AT v  satisfy  eqs. (3.4)-(3.5) with strict inequalities if
[ ] ( ) N c u c i i i ij / 1 1 , + + <r . Therefore, the claim follows by the continuity of the sequence  { } ) (t v
on  { } ) 1 ( ), 1 ( + + t p t s  and the parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r , the hemicontinuity of G, and the continuity
of l on the parameters  ( ) ij i c u , , r . z
Proof of Lemma 4.3:  Take  0 > e  and let  ( ) { } e < ˛ ” p p d A p M
AT
ij , : . Take  ) 2 , 0 ( ˛ y  close
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Let  Y ” Y
1  and 
n n Y Y ” Y
+ o
1 . Notice that 
n Y  is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
Also notice that  C
n ￿ Y ) 1 (  since  { }
AT s = D ) 1 (  and equations (1.1) become  ￿ =
k
kj ij t p
N




AT s t s = ) ( . According to Lemma 3.2, there exists t such that  ( ) 1
t Y  is contained in the
interior of C ” C￿. Hence, there exist a sequence  { }
t d 1 = n n  such that  1 < n d ,  M n
n ￿ Y ) (d , and
( ) ￿ ￿ Y C t
t d . Thus, if  { }
t d d 1 max = = n n ,  ) ( ) ( d L ˛ t s , and  C p ˛ ) 1 ( , the path  { } ) 1 ( + t p  given by
( ) ) ( ), ( ) 1 ( t s t p h t p = +  is in M and, consequently, the claim follows. z
Proof of Proposition 4.4:  I will prove next the existence of the steady state. Fix (w,l). Let
￿ = ”
) )( (
1 ] 1 , 0 [
N N N
k T . Define the correspondence  T A g ﬁ :  by  ) , ; ( ) ( l w p p g G = . Notice that g isPage 22
nonempty, upper  hemicontinuous, and convex valued. Define also the correspondence
T A T A · ﬁ · : f  by  [ ] ) ( ), , ( ) , ( p g s p h s p = f . Notice that  T A·  is a non-empty, compact, and
convex space and f is a non-empty, upper hemicontinuous, and convex valued correspondence.
Hence, according to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, the correspondence  f has a fixed point;
that is, there exists  T A w · ˛ ) , ]( , [ l s p  such that  [ ] ) , ]( , [ ) , ]( , [ l s p f l s p w w ˛ .
Define now the  correpondence  y with argument  ) , ( l w  by the set of fixed points
) , ]( , [ l s p w  of  f. Notice that  y is upper  hemicontinuous since it is closed and its
counterdomain compact. Notice also that, according to Lemma 3.2,  ) 0 , 1 ]( , [ s p  is the unique
fixed point of  f since  ) 0 , 1 ( s  is the vector of always-trade strategies. Then, the steady-state
claim follows by continuity and Lemma 4.2 taking appropriate intersections.
Now, I will prove the last part of the proposition. The idea of the proof is to use
continuity because any path with always-trade converges according to Lemma 3.2 and the law of
motion  ( )
AT s p h ,  is linear in p (see eqs. (*) of the proof of Lemma 3.2). This means that,
eliminating appropriately variables, as we will see, the eigenvalues of the matrix associated are
less than one in absolute value. Hence, I can prove asymptotic stability for some steady states.




ki s s = , j „ k, j „ l, is that
for a neighborhood M of 
AT p  and a neighborhood U of  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( = l w , the “restricted G,” say
￿ = ﬁ ·
) )( (
1 ] 1 , 0 [ :
N N N
k U M g , is a continuously differentiable function since it is defined by
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I will prove asymptotic stability for this kind of restricted steady states by showing that there
exists a neighborhood X  of  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( = l w , such that for any  X w ˛ ) , ( l , a function which
describe the law of motion of inventory distributions,  [ ] ( ) l g , , , w h ￿ ￿  is continuously
differentiable in a neighborhood of the steady state  ) , ( l p w  and its  Jacobian evaluated at
) , ( l p w  has eigenvalues less than one in absolute value.
The difficulty here is that we cannot use directly  [ ] ( ) l g , , , w h ￿ ￿ . To see the reason let G
be the matrix associated to the linear function  [ ] ( ) ( )
AT s h h , 0 , 1 , , ￿ = ￿ ￿ g . Because this function
has a unique fixed point different to the null vector, the matrix (I - G) is singular. Another way to
see the difficulty is noticing that G has an eigenvalue equal to one because the components of
any column of G add to 1.Page 23
Using the identities  ￿ + „ + - =
1 1 ,
1
i j ij i i p
N
p  to eliminate  1 , + i i p  from the law of motion
[ ] ( ) l g , , , w h ￿ ￿ , we get the continuously differentiable function f with argument p given  ( ) l , w ;
say with argument ( ) l , ;w p . Since  ( ) 0 , 1 ; p f  is linear in p, let F the matrix associated. Notice that
( ) b p F p f + ￿ = 0 , 1 ;  for some non-null vector b of constants. Since  ( ) 0 , 1 ; p f  has a unique fixed
point, (I - F) is not singular. Moreover, since any path with always-trade strategies converges, all
the eigenvalues of F are less than one in absolute value.
Since the correspondence defined by the set of fixed points  ) , ( l p w  is upper
hemicontinuous, the Jacobian of f as a function of  ) , ( l w  is upper continuous. Finally, notice that
the eigenvalues of a matrix are continuous on the elements of that matrix since the “zeros” of a
polynomial are continuous, taking into account  multiplicities, on the coefficients of the
polynomial. Thus, there exists a neighborhood X of  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( = l w , such that there exists a steady
state  ) , ( l p w ,  ( ) l , ;w f ￿  is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of  ) , ( l p w , and the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of  ( ) l , ;w f ￿  evaluated at  ) , ( l p w  are less than one in absolute
value if  X w ˛ ) , ( l . zPage 24
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